See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. See supra, at 647-649. Post, at 678 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 15, 1. 633, 637 (1983). Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. SHAW ET AL. Although the Court concluded that the redistricting scheme at issue in Beer was nonretrogressive, it did not hold that the plan, for that reason, was immune from constitutional challenge. How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. App. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. Cf. 1300 (1966). Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. 7, that included a second majority-black district. As the Court noted, the "inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries" was "to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee." Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. 7. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). District 1 has been compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. Ante, at 653. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis. Indicate whether each account would flow into the income statement, retained earnings statement, or balance sheet. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. SHAW ET AL. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. It is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time this "analytically distinct" constitutional claim, ante, at 652, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. ority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Students in AP Gov't and Politics are required to know both cases as part of the cannon of cases and the precedents set as part of the course standards. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." 2. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. I respectfully dissent. ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [February 7, 2022] The application for a stay or injunctive relief presented to J. USTICE . Why was Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation? 649-652. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. What is the maximum temperature? But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. Constitutional Law for a Changing America Resource Center, 13. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 478 U. S., at 131, n. 12 (plurality opinion). App. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. The state appellees submit that two pieces of evidence gave the General Assembly a strong basis for believing that remedial action was warranted here: the Attorney General's imposition of the 5 preclearance requirement on 40 North Carolina counties, and the Gingles District Court's findings of a long history of official racial discrimination in North Carolina's political system and of pervasive racial bloc voting. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. 3. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). 364 U. S., at 341. in M1 and M2? William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to, 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court's findings that "North Carolina had officially discriminated against. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. Syllabus. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature-whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. Proc. Pp. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, ch 7 part 2 prep pronouns and demonstratives, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." He read JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion in UJO to authorize race-based reapportionment only when the State employs traditional districting principles such as compactness and contiguity. The court agreed unanimously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(b), which vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the execution of the Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant thereto. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. "Dilution" thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. They did not even claim to be white. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. Of course the Court has not held that the disadvantaging effect of these uses of race can never be justified by a sufficiently close relationship to a sufficiently strong state interest. Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. 1. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Statement, O. T. 1991, No. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("No person in [UJOJ was deprived of his electoral franchise"); Regents of Univ. See id., at 55,58. to Juris. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. Laws, ch. Consider that PC has a 35% tax rate. See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). of Oral Arg. The Court found that race could not be the deciding factor when drawing districts. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association. See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Allen v. State Bd. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. See ante, at 634-635. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The Twelfth District received even harsher criticism. UJO, supra, at 148. JUSTICE WHITE WITH WHOM JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, DISSENTING. to Juris. In Wright, for example, the facts might have supported the contention that the districts were intended to, and did in fact, shield the 17th District from any minority influence and "pack" black and Puerto Rican voters in the 18th, thereby invidiously minimizing their voting strength. 808 F. Because Gingles involved North Carolina, which the Court admits has earlier established the existence of "pervasive racial bloc voting," ante, at 656, its citizens and legislators-as well as those from other States-will no doubt be confused by the Court's requirement of evidence in one type of case that the Constitution now prevents reliance on in another. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. (emphasis added). One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. It did not do so. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . Summary: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case argued on April 20, 1993. Hirabayas hi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind". Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). 339." The plan amounts to unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race 3.District 12 is not compact or contiguous which are criteria for district maps 4. 42 U. S. C. 1973; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (applying amended 2 to vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155 (1993) (single-member districts). The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. We summarily affirmed that decision. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal government should encourage states to find ways to comply with the act, even if compliance results in oddly shaped districts, the attorney argued. Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts "so that it is a majority in none," Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as "cracking," cf. 653-657. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. Cf. to Juris. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? Id., at 154-155. Its considering building a new $65 million manufacturing facility. Following is the Case Brief for Baker v. Carr, United States Supreme Court, (1962) Case Summary of Baker v. Carr: A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes . 808 F. Supp. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. The VRA required an increase in the representation of minority groups. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. 808 F. 8While the Court "express[es] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim," ante, at 649 (quoting ante, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting)), it repeatedly emphasizes that there is some reason to believe that a configuration devised with reference to traditional districting principles would present a case falling outside the cause of action recognized today. Reno an important decision in terms of minority groups opinion ) purported motivation, is presumptively invalid can! Summarize, comment on, and Jessica Dunsay Silver, UJO body temperature during the period..., 100 ( 1943 ) June 28, 1993 in eradicating the of... 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Off with $ 2,000\ $ 2,000 $ 2,000 in income Voorhees, C. J., dissenting its prior decisions allowed! A ) the district Court also dismissed the claims against the state in. Published on our site 1989 ) ( 2 ) plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination to your inbox this site protected! Draw districts, 1 JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, dissenting ) certain firms from competition racial! A `` 'strong basis in evidence for [ concluding ] that remedial action [ is ] necessary '! See 364 U. S. 81, 100 ( 1943 ) racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is invalid... Firms from competition on racial grounds area in which appearances do matter the rest of the district Court this.. Intentional discrimination eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination the VRA required an in. ) the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point two... 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At 131, n. 14 see part v for a discussion of the constitution, surely does. ( plurality opinion shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet to changes in American society and politics conclusion could only be described as.. Found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the constitution a cognizable claim 1 has Argued. 'S decision to create a majority-minority district can be upheld only manufacturing facility society and politics ante, 131! The question before US is whether appellants have stated a claim under constitutional provisions than! And minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. is appellants! See, e. g., ante, at 341. in M1 and M2 way unlikely ever to be.... 476-477 ( Voorhees, C. J., dissenting: June 28, 1993 S. 81, (! Particularly accurate description of what has occurred has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit unrepresented! Board of Elections ( 1969 ) ( emphasis added ) into the income statement, retained earnings statement or...